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Abstract
The network reciprocity is an important dynamic rule fostering the emer-
gence of cooperation among selfish individuals. This was reported firstly in
the seminal work of Nowak and May, where individuals were arranged on
the regular lattice network, and played the prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG).
In the standard PDG, one often assumes that the players have perfect ra-
tionality. However, in reality, we human are far from rational agents, as we
often make mistakes, and behave irrationally. Accordingly, in this work, we
introduce the element of noise into the measurement of fitness, which is de-
termined by the parameter α controlling the degree of noise. The considered
noise-induced mechanism remarkably promotes the behavior of cooperation,
which may be conducive to interpret the emergence of cooperation within
the population.
Keywords: Noise, Fitness, Prisoner’s Dilemma Game, Cooperation,
Imitation
1. Introduction
The emergence and maintenance of cooperation among selfish individu-
als is a ubiquitous phenomenon extensively presenting in various complex
systems, from human or animal societies to self-replicating chemical or bio-
logical systems [1, 2]. To explain this question, the evolutionary game theory
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creates a universal theoretical framework that has been widely studied by
diverse disciplines over the past decades [3, 4, 5, 6]. In particular, the evo-
lutionary prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG) has attracted numerous attention
from broad theoretical issues to specific experimental ones, as it reflects the
social conflict among the independent and selfish people in a simple but
accurate way [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13].
In a typical PDG, two involved players simultaneously make the choice:
cooperate or defect. Each of them will receive a reward R if they both
cooperate, and a punishment P if both defect. If a player defects while the
opponent chooses to cooperate, the former one receives a temptation T , while
the latter loser receives a sucker’s payoff S. The ranking of these four payoffs
is T > R > P > S. This implies that players are more prone to defect if
they both wish to maximize their own payoff, regardless of the opponent’s
decision. The resulting is a social dilemma inducing the widespread defection,
which is however inconsistent with the fact that the cooperative and altruistic
behavior is widely observable in reality. To answer this puzzle, multifarious
mechanisms have been proposed, such as reward and punishment [14, 15,
16, 17, 18], voluntary participation [19, 20], spatially structured population
[21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36], heterogeneity or
diversity [37], the mobility of players [38, 39, 40, 41], age structure [43, 44, 45],
to name but a few.
The network reciprocity is a well-known dynamical rule that fosters the
prevalence of cooperation [46]. It says that if the game players are arranged
on a network, where the individuals occupy the network nodes and the links
determine who interacts with whom, the cooperators can shape compact
clusters to prevent the invasion of defectors [47, 48, 49, 50]. Thus the number
of cooperators will preserve at a high level. Nowak and May [51] proposed
the first model of the networking PDG, where the players were located on the
square lattices. At each round of the dynamical process, players first gathered
their own payoffs via the neighboring interactions based on the regulation of
PDG. Then per player had a chance to adopt the strategy of his neighbors,
if they had higher fitness. By simply introducing the interaction structure
into the consideration, the cooperative behavior can be prevalent.
In the standard PDG, it is assumed that the players have perfect rational-
ity. However, from the perspective of behavior economics, we human are far
from rational calculators, as we often make mistakes, and behave irrationally
[52, 53]. Therefore, at each round of the game, players may not have the
ability to obtain their payoff exactly, due to the presence of noise deriving
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from the fact such as the error of observation. By concerning the diversity or
discrepancy of people [54, 55, 56, 57], the degree of noise for different players
may have some heterogeneity. With the above arguments, we extend the tra-
ditional PDG by introducing the element of noise into the definition of fitness
of individuals. We assume that the noise among different players are inde-
pendent. During the strategy updating stage at each round of the game, the
presence of noise impacts the likelihood of strategy switching for each player
according to the imitation dynamics. To compare with the standard PDG,
we still arrange the players on regular lattice networks following Ref. [51].
We extensively perform the computer simulations to elucidate the impact of
different levels of noise. In the remainder of this paper, we first specify our
modified model of PDG; subsequently, we present the main results; and at
last, we will summarize the conclusions.
2. Model
Let us consider an evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game, where the play-
ers occupy the nodes of a regular L × L square lattice network with the
periodic boundary condition. Each player (each node), e.g. x, is initially
assigned as either a cooperator (sx = C) or a defector (sx = D) with the
equal probability. In the standard PDG governed by the imitation dynamics,
a player updates his strategy according to the following rules: At each round,
the player x performs the PDG with each of his four nearest neighbors, by
which he gathers the resulting gains as his total payoff or fitness. Then he
randomly selects one neighboring player y, and measures the difference of
their fitness at this round, by which he decides whether changes his own
strategy with a probability based the on the Fermi function
W (sy → sx) =
1
1 + exp[(px − py)/K]
, (1)
where K is the intensity of selection [58], and px, py are the fitness of players
x, y, respectively. As mentioned above, in practice, players may not measure
their fitness exactly, due to the presence of noise deriving from many reasons
such as the error of observation. Here we use the parameter µ to reflect the
influence of noise, with α controlling the degree of noise. We define
µ = αχ, (2)
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where χ is a uniformly distributed random number in the interval [-1,1].
Following the notation suggested in Refs. [49, 59], we utilize the rescaled
payoff matrix: the temptation to defect T = b (the highest payoff received by
a defector playing with a cooperator), reward for mutual cooperation R = 1,
and both the punishment for mutual defection P and the sucker’s payoff S
(the lowest payoff required by a cooperator encountering a defector) is equal
to 0, P = S = 0. The condition 1 ≤ b ≤ 2 ensures the proper payoff ranking.
In this modified PDG model, the dynamics is iterated in accordance with the
Monte Carlo (MC) simulation composed of the following elementary steps.
First, player x acquires his total payoff px via interacting with his nearest
neighbors. With the influence of noise, he evaluates his fitness according
to the relation Fx = (1 + µ)px. To some extent, this setup is similar to
a previously studied model [45]. Additionally, compared with the effects of
noise considered in works [60, 61, 62, 63], we mainly consider this factor from
the viewpoint of whole population. Next, by randomly choosing one neighbor
y (his fitness Fy is measured in the same way as x), the focal player x adopts
y’s strategy with the probability
W (sy → sx) =
1
1 + exp[(Fx − Fy)/K]
. (3)
During one full Monte Carlo step (MCS), each player has a chance to up-
date his strategy according to the above procedure. Starting from a random
initial state, this evolutionary process proceeds until the system reaches the
stationary state, at which we record the key statistics: the average density
of cooperator ρC in dependence on parameters K, b, and the connectivity
structure.
The simulation results are mainly obtained by implementing the evolu-
tionary dynamics on the square 100 × 100 lattice network. The density of
cooperators ρC is measured by averaging the last 10
4 full steps of the overall
2×105 MCS. To overcome the impact of randomness, final results have been
averaged over 40 independent runs for each set of parameters.
3. Simulation Results
We start by visualizing the spatial distribution of cooperators and defec-
tors at the equilibrium with four typical values of the parameter α. Figure
1 illustrates the results acquired with b = 1.10, K = 0.1. As shown in the
upper left panel, the cooperators vanish finally when α = 0, which conforms
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to what is expected in the standard model [51]. When α > 0, the cooperators
begin mushrooming. Strikingly, when α is large enough, the cooperators will
prevail in the system with a negligible number of defectors (see the bottom
right panel). This implies that the cooperation behavior can be remarkably
promoted by increasing the value of α.
a b
c d
Figure 1: (Color Online) Snapshots of the spatial distribution of cooperators and defectors
at the stable states with four typical values of α. Each site corresponds to a player. The
cooperators C are represented by the red color, and the defectors D are denoted by green.
From panel (a) to (d), α = 0, 0.25, 0.5, and 0.75, respectively. We fix b = 1.10 andK = 0.1.
To quantify the impact of each parameter on the behavior of cooperation
in detail, we first measure the density of cooperators ρC in dependence on the
temptation b for different values of α. Figure 2(a) clearly elucidates the fact
that increasing α promotes the emergence of cooperation. It is worth men-
tioning that the critical temptation value b = bc, which pinpoints the extinc-
tion of cooperators if b > bc, increases with the growth of α. The monotonous
increase of bc with α is shown in Figure 2(b). This noise induced enhance-
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ment of the survivability of cooperation on square lattice network raises a
question about the universality of this mechanism. Fortunately, the quali-
tatively consistent phenomenon is maintained on other types of interaction
networks. For instance, in Figure 3, we report the results on a triangle lattice
graph with several typical values of α. It is evident that the positive values
of α enhance the emergence of cooperation. The only difference lies in the
fact that the specific values of bc on the triangle lattice graph are a little
smaller than what we can expect on the square lattice network. This implies
the potential of the noise-induced mechanism on promoting the evolution of
cooperation.
（a） （b）
Figure 2: (Color Online) (a) The density of cooperators ρC in dependence on the param-
eters α and b on the regular square lattice network. (b) Phase diagram of the threshold
values of the temptation b = bc, marking the extinction of cooperators if b > bc, as the
parameter α gradually increases. We fix K = 0.1.
As the form of the Fermi function also allows the players to make irra-
tional decision (e.g., the focal player can adopt the strategy of his neighbors
even if Fx > Fy), we also study the impact of parameter K, which char-
acterizes the intensity of selection at the strategy imitation stage. Figure
4(a)(b) show the density of cooperators ρC in dependence on the parameters
α and K on the regular lattices for b = 1.06 (a) and 1.10 (b), respectively.
In general, the density of cooperators ρC decreases with the augment of K
(except for the scenario with α = 0, b = 1.06 and K < 0.3, also see [64, 65]
for comparison). As the increase of K leads to that exp[(Fx−Fy)/K]→ 0, it
is more probable for players to make irrational option, inducing the decrease
of ρC .
To explain the considered mechanism, we report the time courses of ρC for
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Figure 3: (Color Online) The density of cooperators ρC in dependence on the parameter
α and b on the triangle lattice network. We fix K = 0.1.
（a） （b）
Figure 4: (Color Online) (a) The density of cooperators ρC in dependence on the param-
eters α and K on the square lattice network for b = 1.06. (b) The density of cooperators
ρC in dependence on the parameters α and K on the square lattice network for b = 1.10.
several typical values of α on the square lattice network. Figure 5 illustrates
the results obtained with b = 1.10 and K = 0.1. The cooperators die out
when α = 0. By gradually increasing the values of α, the stationary state
is a mixed C +D phase, where the defectors still occupy a large portion of
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the network when α < 0.5. The cooperators begin prevailing after α > 0.5,
and occupy most nodes of the network after α ≥ 0.75. Interestingly, as time
evolves, there is always an early stage that defectors exploit the ground of
cooperators. The smaller the value of α, the more serious the defectors invade
at this stage. However, the cooperators will be aroused after this stage, and
engage in beating the opponents.
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Figure 5: (Color Online) The time courses specifying the evolution of cooperation on the
square lattice network with several typical values of α. We fix b = 1.10 and K = 0.1.
At last, we measure the average payoff of cooperators and defectors on
the square lattice network. The total payoff of any player, e.g., i, is the sum
after he interacts with all the four neighbors, which is written as
pi =
∑
j∈Ωi
φTi ψφj. (4)
where Ωi denotes the set of neighbors of i, and ψ is the payoff matrix. φ
refers to the specific strategy adopted by each player, i.e., φ = (1, 0)T for
cooperators and φ = (0, 1)T for defectors. < PC > is defined as the average
payoff of all cooperators, while < PD > is the average payoff of all defectors.
As seen in Figure 3, one can find that < PC > and < PD > both increase
with α when 0.18 < α < 0.64. Before α > 0.18, < PC >= 0, while after
α > 0.64, < PD >= 0. Thus it is clear why the considered mechanism can
promote the emergence of cooperation, although players do encounter the
social dilemmas.
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Figure 6: (Color Online) The average payoffs under different values of α. < PC > is
denoted by red, < PD > is denoted by green. We fix b = 1.10 and K = 0.1.
4. Conclusion
In sum, by introducing the element of noise into the measurement of
fitness in the prisoner’s dilemma game, our modified model remarkably en-
hances the emergence of cooperation. We find that the introduction of noise
not only serves as a promising mechanism for the evolutionary dynamics on
the square lattice network but also for that of the triangle lattice graph.
Although the defectors can obtain more payoff at the initial stage, the fast
exploitation and thus the shortage of cooperators weakens the advantage of
defectors gradually. The remaining cooperators will form compact clusters
preventing the invasion of defectors, and also engage in beating the oppo-
nents.
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